Sequential games and nondeterministic selection functions by Bolt, Joe et al.
Sequential games and nondeterministic selection
functions
Joe Bolt
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
Jules Hedges
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
Philipp Zahn
Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen
Abstract
This paper analyses Escardó and Oliva’s generalisation of selection functions over a strong monad from
a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on the case of the nondeterminism (finite nonempty powerset)
monad Pf . We use these nondeterministic selection functions of type J PfR X = (X → R)→ Pf(X)
to study sequential games, extending previous work linking (deterministic) selection functions to
game theory. Similar to deterministic selection functions, which compute a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium play of a game, we characterise those non-deterministic selection functions which have a
clear game-theoretic interpretation. We show, surprisingly, no non-deterministic selection function
exists which computes the set of all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium plays. Instead we show that
there are selection functions corresponding to sequential versions of the iterated removal of strictly
dominated strategies.
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1 Introduction
Selection functions are an approach to games of perfect information developed by Escardó
and Oliva in a series of papers beginning with [1]. As well as revealing a deep connection
between game theory and proof theory, this approach elucidates the mathematical structure
of backward induction, a method to compute equilibria, showing that it arises from a
more primitive algebraic structure known as the selection monad. A more general form of
the selection monad was developed in [3] for proof-theoretic purposes, with a special case
appearing in [6]. In this paper we explore this more general structure from a game-theoretic
perspective.
A selection function is a function (specifically a type-2 function, also known as a functional
or operator, i.e. a function whose domain is a set of functions) of type (X → R) → X,
which we write JRX. The operator JR, which associates to every set X the set of functions
(X → R)→ X, is called the selection monad, and it carries an algebraic structure known as
a strong monad. One consequence of this structure is that there is a family of product-like
operators
⊗
:
n∏
i=1
JRXi → JR
n∏
i=1
Xi
called the product of selection functions.
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An important class of selection functions are those of the form ε : JRnX satisfying
ε(k) ∈ arg max(pii ◦ k) for all k : X → Rn, where
arg max(f) = {x : X | f(x) ≥ f(x′) for all x′ : X}
Consider an n-player game of perfect information. That is to say, all players move in turn
and the current state of the game is known all players. In round i, player i selects a move
from the set Xi, with payoffs for all players given by q :
∏n
i=1Xi → Rn. The usual solution
concept for games of this form is known as subgame perfect equilibrium – a strengthening of
Nash equilibrium. These equilibria can be computed using a method known as backward
induction which dates back at least to Zermelo [13].
The key result connecting selection functions with game theory is that if εi is a sequence
of selection functions (1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfying εi(k) ∈ arg max(pii ◦ k) for all k : Xi → Rn, then(
n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q)
is the strategic play of some subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e. the play that results when
the players’ strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium). The
⊗
operator expresses the
essence of the backward induction method in a mathematically pure way. Surprisingly, this
result extends to n =∞ when q is continuous, a highly non-obvious fact about backward
induction that is often directly contradicted in game theory textbooks. For instance, [4, pp.
107- 108]:
When the horizon [of the sequential game] is infinite, the set of subgame-perfect
equilibria cannot be determined by backward induction from the terminal date, as it
can be in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma and in any finite game of perfect
information.
Notice that the operator arg max itself has the type (X → R)→ Pf(X), which we write
J PfR X, when X is finite and nonempty. Also note that in this paper Pf refers to the finite
nonempty powerset monad. In [3] it is proved that J PfR is a strong monad when R is a
meet-semilattice (and more generally that J TR is a strong monad when T is a strong monad
and R is a T -algebra), however this has so far not been addressed through the lens of game
theory. It follows that each choice of meet-semilattice structure on R induces a product
n⊗
i=1
arg max : JR
n∏
i=1
Xi
and hence, if q is the payoff function of a game, we obtain a set of plays (
⊗n
i=1 arg max) (q).
One may conjecture that there is some choice of meet-semilattice structure for which this set
is the set of plays of all subgame perfect equilibria.
We prove that this is not the case. We complement this negative characterization by a
positive one: If one replaces the Nash subgame condition by a weaker condition, which we
call rational, then the product of multivalued selection functions does exactly characterize
the set of all plays in line with this condition. Examples of this weaker condition are weak
and strict dominance of strategies – standard solution concepts in game theory.
Outline. In section 2.1 we give background on selection functions, and in section 2.2
on higher-order sequential games. In section 3 we define a condition on selection functions,
and characterise for 2-round games the product of those selection functions that satisfy this
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condition. In section 4 we show that the product of selection functions does not compute
subgame perfect equilibria in general, and also characterise those cases when it does. In
section 5 we give a more general theorem characterising the product of selection functions
for n-round games, and give concrete examples with selection functions that pick out strictly
dominated strategies.
Additional proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with introducing selection functions and sequential games of perfect information.
2.1 Selection functions
Formally, in this paper we work over some fixed cartesian closed category which contains
analogues of finite sets and R. Since we are working only with finite games, there is no harm
in taking this to be simply the category of sets. We will treat monads ‘Haskell-style’, defined
by their action on objects, their unit and their bind operator (which is Kleisli extension with
the arguments swapped).
I Definition 1. Let T be a strong monad and α : TR → R. The T -selection monad is
defined by J TRX = (X → R)→ TX with the following monad operations:
The unit ηJ
T
R
X : X → J TRX is defined by ηJ
T
R
X (x) = λ(k : X → R).ηTX(x)
The bind operator >>=J TR : J TRX × (X → J TR Y )→ J TR Y is defined by
ε >>=J
T
R f = λ(k : Y → R).ε(h) >>=T g
where g : X → TY is defined by g(x) = f(x)(k) and h : X → R is defined by h(x) =
α
(
g(x) >>=T (ηTR ◦ k)
)
.
I Proposition 2 ([3], Lemma 2.2). If α : TR→ R is a T -algebra then J TR is a strong monad.
As a special case, when T is the identity monad we use the notation JRX = (X → R)→
X, which has bind operator
ε >>=JR f = λ(k : Y → R).g(ε(k ◦ g))
where g : X → Y is defined by g(x) = f(x)(k). Since the identity function uniquely makes
every type into an algebra of the identity monad, JR is a strong monad for every R.
Every strong monad T admits a monoidal product operator
⊗ : TX × TY → T (X × Y )
(in fact it admits two in general, and we take the ‘left-leaning’ one), and a more general
dependent monoidal product operator
⊗ : TX × (X → TY )→ T (X × Y )
For example, for the finite nonempty powerset monad Pf the monoidal product is given by
cartesian product of sets
a⊗Pf b = {(x, y) | x ∈ a, y ∈ b}
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and the dependent monoidal product is the ‘dependent cartesian product’
a⊗Pf f = {(x, y) | x ∈ a, y ∈ f(x)}
For the purposes of this paper we will only need the simple monoidal product of the
selection monad, but it is defined in terms of the dependent monoidal product of the
underlying monad. Concretely, the simple monoidal product
⊗J TR : J TRX × J TR Y → J TR (X × Y )
is defined by
ε⊗J TR δ = λ(k : X × Y → R).a⊗T f
where a : TX is defined by a = ε
(
λx.α
(
f(x) >>=T
(
λy.ηTR(k(x, y))
)))
and f : X → TY is
defined by f(x) = δ(λy.k(x, y)).
When T is the identity monad this simplifies to
ε⊗ δ = λ(k : X × Y → R).(a, f(a))
where a = ε(λx.q(x, fx)) and f(x) = δ(λy.q(x, y)). Alternatively, when T = Pf it is
ε⊗ δ = λ(k : X × Y → R).{(x, y) | x ∈ a, y ∈ f(x)}
where a = ε (λx.
∨{q(x, y) | y ∈ f(x)}) and f(x) = δ(λy.q(x, y)), where the Pf-algebra is
written
∨
: PfR→ R.
2.2 Higher-order sequential games
A sequential game of perfect information is one in which players take turns sequentially, one
player per round, with each player being able to perfectly observe the moves made in earlier
rounds.
Higher-order sequential games are a generalisation introduced in [1] in which each player
carries a selection function that defines what they consider ‘rational’. Ordinary (or ‘classical’)
sequential games are obtained as the special case in which every player’s selection function
is arg max. An in-depth discussion of the decision-theoretic and game-theoretic content of
higher-order games can be found in [8, 9].
I Definition 3. An n-round higher order sequential game of perfect information is defined
by the following data:
For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a finite nonempty set Xi of choices
A set R of outcomes, and an outcome function q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
For each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a multi-valued selection function εi : J PfR Xi
There are several small variants of this definition in the literature, which replace multi-
valued selection functions with related higher order functions. The original definition in [1]
equipped players with a ‘quantifier’ of type (X → R)→ R rather than a selection function,
with the motivating example being max : (X → R) → R. This was then generalised to
multi-valued quantifiers of type (X → R)→ P(R) in [2]. The definition stated above was
given in [7, section 1.3], and is based on the definition of Nash equilibrium for higher-order
simultaneous games in [9]. Here, we apply this definition in the context of sequential games.
We will often focus on 2-player sequential games, in which we write the sets of choices as
X and Y , and the selection functions as ε : J PfR X and δ : J PfR Y .
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I Definition 4. An n-round classical sequential game of perfect information is a sequential
game in which the set of outcomes is R = Rn, and the selection functions are
εi(k) = arg max(pii ◦ k)
A classical game is one in which each player receives a real-valued outcome, and players
act such as to maximise their individual outcome, with no preference over the outcomes of
the other players. Note that we will refer to such outcomes as payoffs, and to the outcome
functions as payoff functions as it is the standard in classical game theory. By different
choices of q, this allows representation of both conflict and cooperative situations, and games
with aspects of both, as is standard in game theory.
I Definition 5. A strategy for player i in a sequential game is a function σi :
∏i−1
j=1Xj → Xi
that makes a choice for player i contingent on the choices observed in previous rounds. A
strategy profile is a tuple σ :
∏n
i=1
(∏i−1
j=1Xj → Xi
)
consisting of a strategy for each player.
The set of strategy profiles of a game is written Σ.
Notice that a strategy for the first player is just an element of X1, up to isomorphism.
I Definition 6. A play of a sequential game is a tuple x :
∏n
i=1Xi of choices. Every strategy
profile σ induces a play P(σ), called the strategic play of σ, by ‘playing out’, or more precisely
by the course-of-values recursion
(P(σ))i = σi((P(σ))1, . . . , (P(σ))i−1)
This defines a function P : Σ→∏ni=1Xi.
This definition includes the base case (P(σ))1 = σ1(), i.e. the choice made by the first
player is just the choice that her strategy tells her to play.
I Definition 7. A partial play of a sequential game is a tuple x :
∏j
i=1Xi for some j < n.
Given a partial play x, a tuple of strategies
σ :
n∏
i=j+1
(
i−1∏
k=1
Xk → Xi
)
induces a play xσ called the strategic extension of x by σ, given by
xσi =
{
xi if i ≤ j
σi(xσ1 , · · · , xσi−1) otherwise.
A strategy profile of a 2-player sequential game is a tuple σ : X × (X → Y ), and the
strategic play of σ is (σ1, σ2(σ1)). Also notice that the strategic extension of the empty
partial play by σ is P(σ).
Selection functions in general describe what choices, plays or strategies are ‘good’ or
‘rational’ for a player. But there are several possibilities we can consider concretely. In the
following, looking through the lens of game theory, we investigate these candidates.
3 Well-behaved selection functions
We will now specify ‘niceness’ constraints for multi-valued selection functions. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the ‘niceness’ of a multivalued selection function relates to its interaction
with the semilattice R. The correct definition of this property is non-obvious, but does have
a natural game theoretic interpretation.
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I Definition 8 (Witnessing selection function). A multi-valued selection function ε : J PfR (X)
is witnessing if, for all indexing functions I : X → Pf(X → R), if
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′
px′
)
then there exists a choice function p− : X → (X → R) for I (so px′ ∈ Ix′ for all x′) such
that
x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′).
Ix is thought of as the set of contexts that might arise if x is chosen. The choice function
p− picks out a ‘plausible scenario,’ a possible context for each choice that could be made. In
game theoretic terms, a witnessing selection function represents a player that finds a move x
acceptable to play only if there is some plausible hypothesis regarding how later players will
behave under which x is an acceptable move. Note that the use of choice functions here does
not invoke the axiom of choice as we are working with finite nonempty powersets.
I Definition 9 (Upwards closed selection function). A multi-valued selection function ε :
J PfR (X) is upwards closed if, whenever p− : X → (X → R) is a choice function for I such
that x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′), it holds that
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′
px′
)
.
Upwards closure is a converse notion to witnessing. If x is an acceptable choice, then x
remains an acceptable choice in contexts where other possible contexts are added and then
combined with the join operator (this notion is, admittedly, more game theoretically vague
but its interpretation will become clearer in the case where R = Pf(R) and the semilattice
join is given by union).
A good heuristic for thinking about witnessing and upwards closed selection functions
is as follows. Suppose ε : J PfR (X) and that X = {x1, · · · , xn} and let I : X → Pf(X → R)
with Ix = {px1 · · · , pxmx}. We can organise this information in a game tree:
x1
xn
px11 x1
px1mx1x1
pxn1 xn
pxnmxnxn
...
...
...
A choice function q− : X → (X → R) for I then corresponds to choosing a leaf of this tree
for each x ∈ X. Visually (omitting dots for clarity),
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x1
xn
px11 x1
px1mx1x1
pxn1 xn
pxnmxnxn
qx1x1
qxnxn
The red subtree then corresponds to the context λx.qxx. Contrastingly, the context
λx.
∨
p∈Ix px corresponds to the collapsed game tree∨
p∈Ix1 px1
∨
p∈Ixn pxn
x1
xn
...
A witnessing selection function is a selection function where, if x is an acceptable play
in the collapsed tree, there is some choice of leaves such that x is an acceptable play in the
associated context. An upwards closed selection function has the converse property: if there
is a choice of leaves under which x is an acceptable play, then x is an acceptable play in the
collapsed tree.
I Example 10. We will show that arg max is witnessing but not upwards closed. For a finite
set X, define arg max : (X → R)→ Pf(X) by
arg max(k) =
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣ ∀x′ ∈ X kx ≥ kx′}.
arg max is then a multi-valued selection function with the join operator on R given by max.
Claim 1: arg max is witnessing. Proof: Suppose
x ∈ arg max
(
λx′. max
p∈Ix′
px′
)
for some I : X → Pf(X → R). Then ∀x′ ∈ X it holds that
max
p∈Ix
px ≥ max
p∈Ix′
px′.
As Ix′ is finite, we can choose px′ ∈ Ix′ such that px′x′ = maxp∈Ix′ px′. Then
x ∈ arg max
(
λx′.px′x′
)
.
Hence arg max is witnessing.
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Claim 2: arg max is not upwards closed. Proof: Let X = {0, 1} and let ci : X → R
denote the constant function x 7→ i. Define I : X → Pf(X → R) by
0 7→ {c0}
1 7→ {c1, c−1}
Note that the function λx.maxp∈Ix px is given by
0 7→ 0
1 7→ 1
and, hence, arg max
(
λx.maxp∈Ix px
)
= {1}. Define a choice function p− : X → (X → R)
for I by p0 = c0 and p1 = c−1. Then arg max
(
λx.pxx
)
= {0}, but {0} 6⊆ {1} and hence
arg max is not upwards closed.
That arg max is witnessing follows from a more general result regarding multi-valued
selection functions for which the semilattice R is total.
I Proposition 11. If the semilattice R is total, then for all sets X and all selection functions
ε : J PfR (X), ε is witnessing.
We now consider an example of a multi-valued selection function which is upwards closed
but not witnessing.
I Example 12. Let X = {0, ?}. We think of ? as ε’s ‘favourite move’ that they are happy
to play in any context. Define a semilattice R = {>,⊥1,⊥2} where ⊥1 ≤ >, ⊥2 ≤ >, and
⊥1 and ⊥2 are not comparable. Define ε : J PfR (X) by
ε(p) = {?} ∪ {x ∈ X | px = >}.
Suppose that x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′) where px′ ∈ Ix′ for some I : X → Pf(X → R). Then either
x = ? or pxx = >. In either case, x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′ px
′
)
. Hence ε is upwards closed.
Conversely, define an indexing function given by I0 = I? = {c⊥1 , c⊥2} (where the ci are
constant functions as in the previous example). Then 0 ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′ px
′
)
= X, but there
is no choice function p− : X → (X → R) for I such that 0 ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′). Hence ε is not
witnessing.
We now define a notion of rationality for nondeterministic games. A strategy profile
is rational precisely when there is some plausible hypothesis about how later players will
behave under which that strategy profile is acceptable. As it sounds, this notion is closely
linked to the properties ‘witnessing’ and ‘upwards closed.’ We will show that witnessing and
upwards closed selection functions compute precisely the plays of rational strategy profiles.
We start by restricting ourselves to the two player case where an arbitrary game is given by
(q : X × Y → R, ε : J PfR (X), δ : J PfR (Y )).
I Definition 13 (Rational strategy profile). Let ε : J PfR (X), δ : J PfR (Y ), and q : X × Y → R.
A strategy profile (σ1 : X,σ2 : X → Y ) is rational for (q, ε, δ) if
1. There is a choice function y(−) : X → Y where for all x ∈ X it holds that y(x) ∈
δ
(
q(x,−)) and
σ1 ∈ ε
(
λx.q(x, y(x))
)
;
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2. For all x ∈ X
σ2x ∈ δ(q(x,−)).
The set of rational plays is
Rat(q, ε, δ) =
{
(x, y) ∈ X × Y
∣∣∣ (x, y) = (σ1, σ2σ1) for some rational (σ1, σ2)}.
Rational strategy profiles and witnessing/upwards closed selection functions are related
by the following theorem.
I Theorem 14. Let ε : J PfR (X) be a multi-valued selection function. The following equival-
ences hold.
1. ε is witnessing if and only if for any q : X × Y → R and δ : J PfR (Y ) it holds that
(ε⊗ δ)(q) ⊆ Rat(q, ε, δ).
2. ε is upwards closed if and only if for any q : X × Y → R and δ : J PfR (Y ) it holds that
Rat(q, ε, δ) ⊆ (ε⊗ δ)(q).
Proof. We first prove the forward directions of both equivalences which follow by definition
chasing.
1. ⇒: Suppose that ε is witnessing and (x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q). That is,
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈δ(q(x′,−))
q(x′, y′)
)
and
y ∈ δ(q(x,−)).
We think of δ(q(−,−)) as an indexing function I : X → Pf(X → R) given by
x′ 7→
{
q(−, y′)
∣∣∣ y′ ∈ δ(q(x′,−))}.
Then, as ε is witnessing, there is a choice function y(−) : X → Y where for all x′ we have
that y(x′) ∈ δ(q(x′,−)) such that
x ∈ ε(λx′.q(x′, y(x′))).
Then a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) where σ1 = x and
σ2x
′ =
{
y if x′ = x
y′ ∈ δ(q(x′,−)) otherwise
is rational with play (x, y).
2. ⇒: Suppose that ε is upwards closed and (σ1, σ2) is rational. Then for all x ∈ X it
holds that σ2x ∈ δ
(
q(x,−)). In particular, σ2σ1 ∈ δ(q(σ1,−)). Also there is y(−) : X → Y
where, for all x in X, y(x) ∈ δ(q(x,−)) and σ1 ∈ ε(λx.q(x, y(x))). As ε is upwards closed,
σ1 ∈ ε
(
λx.
∨
y∈δ(q(x,−))
q(x, y)
)
.
Hence (σ1, σ2σ1) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q).
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For the backwards directions of the two equivalences we will construct a pathological
counter example and prove the contrapositive. Define an outcome function q : X × (X →
R) → R to be function application. That is, q(x, p) = px. Given an indexing function
I : X → Pf(X → R) define δI : J PfR (X → R) by
δI(p) =
{
Ix′ p = q(x′,−)
arbitrary otherwise.
Note that q(x,−) = q(x′,−) if and only if x = x′ or |R| < 2. In the latter case the theorem
holds vacuously for R = ∅ and, for |R| = 1, we have that |X → R| = 1 and so Ix = Ix′ for
all x, x′ ∈ X. Consequently, δI is well-defined.
1. ⇐: Suppose ε is not witnessing. Then there is some indexing function I : X → Pf(X →
R) and
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′
px′
)
such that there is no choice function p− : X → (X → R) for I such that x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′).
By construction,
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′
px′ = λx′.
∨
p∈δI(q(x′,−))
q(x, p)
Then (x, p) ∈ (ε⊗ δI)(p) for any p ∈ δI(q(x,−)). By hypothesis there is no choice function
p− : X → (X → R) for I such that x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′) and hence there are no rational strategy
profiles with play (x, p). Hence (ε⊗ δI)(p) 6⊆ Rat(q, ε, δI).
2. ⇐: Suppose ε is not upwards closed. Then there is I : X → Pf(X → R) and a choice
function p− : X → (X → R) for I such that x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′) and
x 6∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′
px′
)
= ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈δI(q(x′,−))
q(x′, p)
)
Define σ2 : X → (X → R) by σ2(x′) = px′ . Then (x, σ2) is rational but (x, σ2x) 6∈
(ε⊗ δI)(q). J
This theorem has an easy corollary regarding selection functions which are both witnessing
and upwards closed.
I Corollary 15. Suppose ε : J PfR (X) is witnessing and upwards closed. Then for all
q : X × Y → R and all δ : J PfR (Y ), (ε⊗ δ)(q) = Rat(q, ε, δ).
The property of being witnessing is not closed under the independent product of selection
functions. In section 5 we will see an example where ε and δ are both witnessing and upwards
closed, but where (ε ⊗ δ) is not witnessing. A heuristic for why witnessing fails is that it
might be possible to choose witnesses for ε and δ, but be impossible to choose such witnesses
simultaneously. The property of being upwards closed is closed under the independent
product of selection functions.
I Proposition 16. Suppose ε : J PfR (X) and δ : J PfR (Y ) are upwards closed. Then (ε⊗ δ) is
upwards closed.
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4 Relation to Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
A standard solution concept for games with sequential play is the subgame perfect (Nash)
equilibrium (SPE). One may conjecture that selection functions can be chosen such that their
product computes the set of all plays of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show that this
conjecture is false: It is impossible to compute the set of all SPE plays using the product of
selection functions.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria are defined as follows for higher-order sequential games.
I Definition 17. Consider a 2-player higher order sequential game with outcome function
q : X × Y → R and selection functions ε : J PfR X and δ : J PfR Y . A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is
called a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
σ1 ∈ ε(λx.q(x, σ2(x))), and
σ2(x) ∈ δ(λy.q(x, y)) for all x ∈ X
The set of subgame perfect plays of (q, ε, δ) is
SP(q, ε, δ) =
{
(σ1, σ2σ1) ∈ X × Y
∣∣∣ (σ1, σ2) is subgame perfect}.
For comparison, the definition of an ordinary Nash equilibrium is obtained by weakening
the second condition to only be required for x = σ1. In a Nash equilibrium the second player
is only required to play optimally on the equilibrium path, and a Nash equilibrium is subgame
perfect if the second player additionally plays optimally if the first player deviates from
equilibrium.
I Remark 18. Note that subgame perfect strategy profiles are rational: subgame perfect
strategy profiles are those where ε’s plausible hypothesis regarding δ’s future behaviour is
correct.
We now show that the only selection functions which compute the set of subgame perfect
plays are those which are indifferent between all contexts, representing players who have no
preferences over the outcome of any game.
I Theorem 19. Let ε : J PfR (X). If, for all sets Y , selection functions δ : J PfR (Y ), and
functions q : X × Y → R it holds that (ε⊗ δ)(q) = SP(q, ε, δ), then ε is constant.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that for all δ and q, (ε ⊗ δ)(q) =
SP(q, ε, δ), and that ε is not constant. That is, there exist k1, k2 : X → R and x ∈ X such
that x ∈ ε(p1) and x 6∈ ε(p2). Let q : X×(X → R)→ R be the function application operator,
(x, p) 7→ px. Define δ : J PfR (X → R) by
δ(p) =
{
{p1, p2} p = q(x,−)
{p1} otherwise.
As p1 6= p2, we have that |R| > 1. Consequently, q(x,−) = q(x′,−) if and only if x = x′.
Moreover, x′ 6= x implies that δ(q(x′,−)) = {p1}. Consider the play (x, p2) of (q, ε, δ) noting
that, by construction, (x, p2) is not the play of any subgame perfect strategy profile. Define
p− : X → (X → R) to be the constant mapping px′ = p1 so that x ∈ ε(λx′. px′x′) = ε(p1).
As all subgame perfect plays are rational, we have that ε is upwards closed by 14. Hence
(x, p2) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(q), but we have already established that (x, p2) is not a subgame perfect
play.
J
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This proof emphasizes the point that multi-valued selection functions fail to compute
subgame perfect plays due to the possibility of indifference in sequential games. In the case
where x is played, δ is indifferent between playing p1 or p2 whilst ε is not. In games where
there is no such conflicting indifference, witnessing and upwards closed selection functions do
compute the set of subgame perfect plays.
I Definition 20. Let ε : J PfR (X), δ : J PfR (Y ), and q : X × Y → R. We say that (q, ε, δ) has
coinciding indifference if, for all x ∈ X and y, y′ ∈ Y ,
y, y′ ∈ δ(q(x,−)) =⇒ ε(q(−, y)) = ε(q(−, y′))
I Proposition 21. Suppose (q, ε, δ) has coinciding indifference and that ε is witnessing and
upwards closed. Then (ε⊗ δ)(q) = SP(q, ε, δ) = Rat(q, ε, δ).
To summarize, in a two round game with first player ε, (ε ⊗ δ)(q) computes subgame
perfect plays for arbitrary second player δ and arbitrary outcome function q if and only if ε
is constant. (ε⊗ δ)(q) does compute subgame perfect plays in the special cases where ε is
upwards closed and witnessing, and (q, ε, δ) has coinciding indifference.
5 Relation to strictly dominated strategies
In this section we extend the previous results to games of arbitrary length. Note that in this
paper we will only consider games whose length is precisely n (i.e. all plays have length n),
which includes via an encoding games whose length is bounded by n. We do not consider
unbounded games, i.e. games whose plays are all finite but which have arbitrarily long plays,
which would introduce significant complications.
B Notation 1. Given A ⊆ ⋃ni=1Xi, we use A(j) to denote Xj ∩A.
In particular, if Γ is a set of strategies for some sequential game, then Γ(j) denotes the
strategies in Γ which are strategies at round j.
In the 2 player case, if a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is rational for (q, ε, δ), there is some
choice function y(−) : X → Y such that ε makes an acceptable play if δ plays according
to y(−). Equivalently, σ1 is rational if there is some rational σ2 for δ under which σ1 is a
good move. To generalise to the n-round case, we can simply extend this heuristic. Given a
game
(
q, (εi : J PfR (Xi))ni=1
)
, a strategy σ1 : X1 is rational if there are strategies σ2, · · · , σn,
rational for ε2, · · · , εn respectively, under which σ1 is a good move. For players εi acting in
the ‘mid-game,’ a strategy is rational if it is rational for all subgames which are given by
partial plays x ∈∏i−1j=1Xj .
We will define a more general notion of sets of strategies as consistent for a game G. The
set of rational strategy profiles will then be realised as the maximal consistent set of strategy
profiles.
I Definition 22. Let Γ be a set of strategies for a sequential game G. Γ is G-consistent if for
all i < n and σi ∈ Γ(i), and all partial plays x ∈
∏i−1
j=1Xj, there exists σ = (σi+1, · · · , σn)
where σi+1, · · · , σn ∈ Γ such that
σi(x) ∈ εi
(
λy.q
(
(x, y)σ
))
where (x, y)σ is the strategic extension of (x1, · · · , xi−1, y) by (σi+1, · · · , σn).
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Note that if Γ is G-consistent, the G-consistency of Γ ∪ {σi} depends only on Γ(j) for
j > i. With that in mind, we can define the maximal G-consistent set of strategies, denoted
by Σ(G), as follows.
I Definition 23. Σ(G) is given by
Σ(G)(n) =
{
σn ∈ Σ(n) : ∀x ∈
n−1∏
i=1
Xi. σn(x) ∈ εn
(
q(x,−))}
Σ(G)(i) =
{
σi ∈ Σ(i) : {σi} ∪
⋃
j>i
Σ(G)(j) is G-consistent
}
.
I Definition 24. Let Γ be a set of strategies for a sequential game G. A play x ∈∏ni=1Xi is
a Γ play if x is the strategic play of a strategy profile σ where σi ∈ Γ(i) for each i ≤ n.
The following lemma and theorem provide a generalisation of 14 to the n-round case.
I Lemma 25. Let q : X → R and define q′ : X × Y → R by q′(x, y) = q(x). Then, for all
ε : J PfR (X) and δ : J PfR (Y ),
x ∈ ε(q)⇔ ∃y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q′).
Proof. If x ∈ ε(q) then, for all y ∈ Y ,
x ∈ ε(q) = ε
(
λx′.
∨
y∈δ(q(x′))
q(x′)
)
= ε
(
λx′.
∨
y∈δ(q′(x′,−))
q′(x′, y)
)
.
Hence if y ∈ δ(q(x,−)) then (x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q′).
Conversely,
(x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q′)⇒ x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈δ(q′(x′,−))
q′(x′, y′)
)
= ε(q)
J
I Corollary 26. Let
(
q,
(
εi
)n
i=1
)
be a sequential game. Suppose there exists j < n and
qj : Xi × Xn → R such that, for all x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi, qx = qj(xj , xn). Then (xj , xn) ∈
(εj ⊗ εn)(qj) if and only if there exist x1, · · · , xj−1, xj+1, · · · , xn−1 with each xj ∈ Xj such
that (x1, · · · , xn) ∈
(⊗n
i=1 εi
)
(q).
I Theorem 27. Let εi : J PfR (Xi) for i < n. For all sets Xn, selection functions εn : J PfR (Xn),
and outcome functions q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R, the following equivalences hold.
1. εi is witnessing for each i < n if and only if
(⊗n
i=1 εi
)
(q) is a subset of the set of Σ(G)
plays.
2. εi is upwards closed for each i < n if and only if
(⊗n
i=1 εi
)
(q) is a superset of the set
of Σ(G) plays.
Proof. We prove the forward directions of the two equivalences first. The proof proceeds by
induction on n, noting that the cases n = 1 are trivial.
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(1) : Suppose
x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈
( n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q)
. As ε1 is witnessing, it is the play of some rational strategy profile (x1, f : X1 →
∏n
i=2Xi)
of the two round game
(
(X1,
∏n
i=2Xi), (ε1,
⊗n
i=2 εi), q
)
. By hypothesis we have that( n⊗
i=2
εi
)
(q(y1,−))
is a subset of the set of Σ(Gy1) plays for all y1 ∈ X1 where
Gy1 = ((Xi)ni=2, (εi)ni=2, q(y1,−))
Hence f(y1) is the play of some Σ(Gy1)-consistent strategy profile σy1 for all y1 ∈ X1. Then
the strategy profile τ for G given by
τ1 = x1
τi+1(y1, · · · , yi) = σy1i+1(y2, · · · , yi)
is such that τi ∈ Σ(G) for all i and the play of τ is x.
(2) : Suppose that x = (x1, · · · , xn) is the Σ(G) play of (σ1, · · · , σn). A simple check
demonstrates that for all y1 ∈ X1, we have that σ2, · · · , σn ∈ Σ(Gy1). By hypothesis, the
strategic play yσ−11 of (σ2, · · · , σn) for the game Gy1 is such that
y
σ−1
1 ∈
( n⊗
i=2
εi
)(
q(y1,−)
)
.
In particular,
(x2, · · · , xn) ∈
( n⊗
i=2
εi
)(
q(x1,−)
)
. (?)
As x1 = σ1 ∈ Σ(G) there exists τ = (τ2, · · · , τn) with each τi ∈ Σ(G) such that
x1 ∈ ε1
(
λy1.q(yτ1 )
)
and, for all y1 ∈ X1,
(yτ1 )−1 ∈
( n⊗
i=2
εi
)(
q(y1,−)
)
.
As ε1 is upwards closed,
x1 ∈ ε1
(
λ(y1).
∨
z∈Ay1
q(x1, z)
)
where A(y1) =
(⊗n
i=2 εi
)(
q(y1,−)
)
. From this and (?) we conclude that
x ∈
( n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q).
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As for the backward directions, for i < n consider the construction δiI : J PfR (Xi) as in the
proof of 14 and let qi :
(∏n−1
j=1 Xj
)
× (Xi → R)→ R be given by (x, p) 7→ pxi. The converse
directions are then a corollary of 26 and 14 by considering the game (q, (ε1, · · · , εn−1, δI))
for each i.
J
We have seen that nondeterministic selection functions do not, in general, describe
subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We have also given a technical characterisation of the
plays nondeterministic selection functions do describe. In this section we make sense of this
technical characterisation, relating it to a solution concept that is already well-known.
I Definition 28. Let S, T ⊆ R. S strictly dominates T if min(S) > max(T ). We write
S s T .
We now define the strict dominance selection functions to be those that return the set of
choices that are not mapped to strictly dominated subsets of the reals for a given context.
I Definition 29. Let R be Pf(Rn) where the semilattice join is given by union (equivalently,
the order structure is given by inclusion). Given p : Xi → Pf(Rn), define pi : Xi → Pf(R) to
be (Pfpii) ◦ p. Define the ith strict dominance selection function, εsi : J PfR (Xi) by
εsi (p : Xi → Pf(Rn)) =
{
xi ∈ Xi
∣∣∣∣ ∀x′i ∈ Xi, pixi 6≺s pix′i}.
The strict dominance selection functions are witnessing and upwards closed, demonstrating
that they provide an appropriate solution concept for multi-valued selection functions.
I Proposition 30. εsi is witnessing and upwards closed.
The product of strict dominance selection functions provides an example of when the
product of two witnessing selection functions is not witnessing.
I Proposition 31. Let X = {0, 1} and let ε = εs1 and δ = εs2 (so ε, δ : J PfR (X) for
R = Pf(R2)). Then (ε⊗ δ) is not witnessing.
Consider the game given by G = (q, (εs1, · · · , εsn)). By 27, we know that (⊗ni=1 εi)(q) is
equal to the set of Σ(G) plays. The set of strategies Σ(G) is then the maximal set of strategies
such that no strategy is strictly dominated in any subgame. When each Xi is finite, this is the
same as
(⊗n
i=1 ε
s
i
)
(q) computing the plays of strategies obtained via the iterated removal of
strictly dominated strategies. This iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies is a well
known solution concept [4, 11, 12] and goes back to [5] and [10]. In economic game theory
this concept is typically applied statically to normal form games whereas in the context of
selection functions we apply it to sequential games.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 11. Suppose R is total and I : X → Pf(X → R). Then for all x′ ∈ X
there exists px′ ∈ Ix′ such that∨
p∈Ix′
px′ = px′x′.
Then
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
p∈Ix′
px′
)
=⇒ x ∈ ε(λx′.px′x′)
J
Proof of Proposition 16. Suppose (x, y) ∈ (ε ⊗ δ)(λ(x′, y′)p(x′,y′)(x′, y′)) where p(−,−) :
X × Y → (X × Y → R) is a choice function for some I : X × Y → Pf(X × Y → R). Then
1. y ∈ δ(λy′.p(x,y′)(x, y′)); and
2.
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈δ(p(x′,−)(x′,−))
p(x′,y′)(x′, y′)
)
.
In order to show that (x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(λ(x′, y′).∨p∈I(x′,y′) p(x′, y′)) we need to show
(a)
y ∈ δ
(
λy′.
∨
p∈I(x,y′)
p(x, y′)
)
and
J. Bolt, J. Hedges, and P. Zahn XX:17
(b)
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈Ax′
∨
p∈I(x′,y′)
p(x′, y′)
)
.
where Ax′ = δ
(
λy′′.
∨
p∈I(x′,y′′) p(x′, y′′)
)
.
As δ is upwards closed we have that, for all x′ ∈ X,
y′ ∈ δ
(
λy′′.p(x′,y′′)(x′, y′′)
)
⇒ y′ ∈ Ax′.
In particular, (a) holds. By using upwards closure of ε twice, we have
x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈δ(p(x′,−)(x′,−))
p(x′,y′)(x′, y′)
)
⇒ x ∈
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈Ax′
p(x′,y′)(x′, y′)
)
⇒ x ∈ ε
(
λx′.
∨
y′∈Ax′
∨
p∈I(x′,y′)
p(x′, y′)
)
J
Proof of Proposition 21. Let (x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q). By 14, (x, y) is the play of some rational
strategy profile (σ1, σ2). Then there exists some function y(−) : X → Y where, for all
x′ ∈ X, y(x′) ∈ δ(q(x′,−)) and σ1 ∈ ε(λx′. q(x′, y(x′))). By coinciding indifference, σ1 ∈
ε
(
λx′.q(x′, σ2x′)
)
.
Conversely, subgame perfect plays are rational. Hence, if (x, y) is a subgame perfect play,
then (x, y) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)(q) by 14. J
Proof of corollary 26. The proof proceeds by a routine induction on n, noting that the case
n = 2 is trivial. When j 6= 1 the result follows easily by choosing
x1 ∈ ε1
(
λy1.
∨
(y2,··· ,yn)∈A(y2,··· ,yn)
q(y1, · · · , yn)
)
where A(y1) = (
⊗m
i=2 εi)(q(y1,−)) and applying the inductive hypothesis to the game
(q(x1),
(
εi
)n
i=2). For the case j = 1, note that the function
λy1, · · · , yn
∨
yn∈εn(q(y1,··· ,yn−1,−))
q(y1, · · · , yn)
is mute in every variable except y1. Then, using 25,
(x1, xn) ∈ (ε1 ⊗ εn)(q1)
⇔ x1 ∈ ε1
(
λy1.
∨
yn∈εn(q1(y1,−))
q1(y1, yn)
)
and xn ∈ εn
(
q1(x1,−)
)
⇔ ∃x ∈
n−1∏
i=2
Xi. (x1, x) ∈
( n−1⊗
i=1
εi
)(
λy1, y.
∨
yn∈εn(q(y1,y,−))
q(y1, y, yn)
)
and xn ∈ εn
(
q(x1, x,−)
)
⇔ ∃x ∈
n−1∏
i=1
Xi. (x1, x, xn) ∈
( n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q).
J
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Proof of Proposition 27. We prove the forward directions of the two equivalences first. The
proof proceeds by induction on n, noting that the cases n = 1 are trivial.
(1) : Suppose
x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈
( n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q)
. As ε1 is witnessing, it is the play of some rational strategy profile (x1, f : X1 →
∏n
i=2Xi)
of the two round game
(
(X1,
∏n
i=2Xi), (ε1,
⊗n
i=2 εi), q
)
. By hypothesis we have that( n⊗
i=2
εi
)
(q(y1,−))
is a subset of the set of Σ(Gy1) plays for all y1 ∈ X1 where
Gy1 = ((Xi)ni=2, (εi)ni=2, q(y1,−))
Hence f(y1) is the play of some Σ(Gy1)-consistent strategy profile σy1 for all y1 ∈ X1. Then
the strategy profile τ for G given by
τ1 = x1
τi+1(y1, · · · , yi) = σy1i+1(y2, · · · , yi)
is such that τi ∈ Σ(G) for all i and the play of τ is x.
(2) : Suppose that x = (x1, · · · , xn) is the Σ(G) play of (σ1, · · · , σn). A simple check
demonstrates that for all y1 ∈ X1, we have that σ2, · · · , σn ∈ Σ(Gy1). By hypothesis, the
strategic play yσ−11 of (σ2, · · · , σn) for the game Gy1 is such that
y
σ−1
1 ∈
( n⊗
i=2
εi
)(
q(y1,−)
)
.
In particular,
(x2, · · · , xn) ∈
( n⊗
i=2
εi
)(
q(x1,−)
)
. (?)
As x1 = σ1 ∈ Σ(G) there exists τ = (τ2, · · · , τn) with each τi ∈ Σ(G) such that
x1 ∈ ε1
(
λy1.q(yτ1 )
)
and, for all y1 ∈ X1,
(yτ1 )−1 ∈
( n⊗
i=2
εi
)(
q(y1,−)
)
.
As ε1 is upwards closed,
x1 ∈ ε1
(
λ(y1).
∨
z∈Ay1
q(x1, z)
)
where A(y1) =
(⊗n
i=2 εi
)(
q(y1,−)
)
. From this and (?) we conclude that
x ∈
( n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q).
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As for the backward directions, for i < n consider the construction δiI : J PfR (Xi) as in the
proof of 14 and let qi :
(∏n−1
j=1 Xj
)
× (Xi → R)→ R be given by (x, p) 7→ pxi. The converse
directions are then a corollary of 26 and 14 by considering the game (q, (ε1, · · · , εn−1, δI))
for each i.
J
Proof of Proposition 30. Let I : Xi → Pf(Xi → Pf(Rn)). Suppose first that
x ∈ εsi (λx′.
⋃
p∈Ix′
px′).
That is, for all x′ ∈ Xi,
max(
⋃
p∈Ix
pix) ≥ min(
⋃
p∈Ix′
pix′)
Then, setting px ∈ Ix to be a function attaining the maximum of
⋃
p∈Ix p
ix and, for x′ 6= x,
setting px′ ∈ Ix′ to be a function attaining the minimum of
⋃
p∈Ix′ p
ix′, we define a choice
function p− : Xi → (Xi → Pf(Rn)) such that
x ∈ εsi (λx′.px′x′).
Hence εsi is witnessing.
It is similarly easy to show that εsi is upwards closed as
max(pixx) ≥ min(pix′x′) =⇒ max(
⋃
p∈Ix
pix) ≥ min(
⋃
p∈Ix′
pix′).
J
Proof of Proposition 31. Define contexts pε, pδ, p0 : X2 → Pf(R2) by
pε(x, x′) =
{
{(1,−1)} x = x′ = 0
{(0, 0)} otherwise
pδ(x, x′) =
{
{(−1, 1)} x = x′ = 0
{(0, 0)} otherwise
p0(x, x′) = {(0, 0)}.
Define I : X2 → Pf(X2 → Pf(R2)) by
I(x, x′) =
{
{pε, pδ} x = x′ = 0
{p0} otherwise.
We think of ε and δ as playing the following game where the outcome function is chosen
nondeterministically.
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ε
δ
δ
0
1
{pε, pδ}0
{p0}1
{p0}0
{p0}1
We will see that (ε⊗ δ) fails to be witnessing as ε is satisfied with playing 0 in the case (0, 0)
results in pε and δ is satisfied playing 0 when (0, 0) results in pδ, but there is no possible
resulting context under which both ε and δ are happy to choose 0. Indeed, simple checks
verify that
(0, 0) ∈ (ε⊗ δ)
(
λ(x, y).
⋃
p∈I(x,y)
p(x, y)
)
but that there is no choice function p:X2 → (X2 → Pf(R2)) for I with (0, 0) ∈ (ε ⊗
δ)(λ(x, y).p(x,y)(x, y)). J
